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Abstract:  
Making links between micro and macro levels has been problematic in the social sciences, 
and the literature in strategic management and organization theory is no exception.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to raise theoretical issues in developing micro-foundations for 
strategic management and organizational analysis. We discuss more general problems with 
collectivism in the social sciences by focusing on specific problems in extant organizational 
analysis. We introduce micro-foundations to the literature by explicating the underlying 
theoretical foundations of the origins of individual action and interaction.  We highlight 
opportunities for future research, specifically emphasizing the need for a rational choice 
program in management research. 
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Traditionally, some of the most troublesome issues in the social sciences have been those that relate to 
analytical levels and units of analysis (Machlup, 1967; Klein et al. 1994). Notably, for more than a 
hundred years, economics (e.g., Menger, 1883; Hayek 1952; Arrow 1951; Dosi 1995), sociology (e.g., 
Durkheim,1962; Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 1970; Coleman 1990) and the philosophy of science (Popper, 
1957; Satz and Ferejohn, 1994) have witnessed a debate as to whether individuals (“micro”) or social 
collectives (“macro”) have explanatory primacy. This debate has raged under the label of 
“methodological individualism” versus “methodological collectivism.” The issue and debate carry very 
substantial theoretical and explanatory implications; for example, what are the relations between micro 
and macro levels? Do we always need to invoke micro-level explanatory mechanisms when trying to 
explain some macro-level phenomenon? Is it legitimate to rely on aggregate constructs as part of the 
explanans ⎯ or, are these only present in the explanandum of an explanatory structure? Although it is 
surely possible to conceptually separate the methodological domain (“How should theories be constructed 
and evaluated?”) from the ontological (“What exists in the world?), the issue and the debate also carries 
substantial philosophical implications, and furthermore, very different philosophical positions may be, 
and have been, invoked to defend the respective positions. Further related questions include – What is the 
ontological status of aggregate social entities (e.g., organizations)? In what sense can organizations be 
said to exist independently of individuals? Is it meaningful to ascribe intention and actions to 
organizations?  
Clearly, these issues are also of immense relevance for theory-building in organizational theory and 
strategic management.  However, while considerable, recent attention is being paid to “levels issues”, 
“multiple level analysis” and the like in management research (e.g., Klein et al. 1994; Danseareu et al., 
1999), strategic management has seen no, or few, efforts to reconcile micro and macro-levels, or more 
generally, efforts to build micro-foundations (though see Coff 1999; Lippman and Rumelt 2003a&b; Foss 
and Foss 2005).
1  There are three possible reasons for this. First, one may speculate that the lack of micro-
foundations is perhaps based on an implicit agreement that such discussions are best left at the level of the 
base disciplines (e.g., psychology at the individual level). That is, it can be argued that strategic 
                                                           
1 In contrast, economics has for more than three decades witnessed much fundamental theoretical inquiry has been 
devoted to establishing micro-foundations for macro-economics. The “micro-foundations project” implies the 
building of rigorous mathematical models that demonstrate how individual action and interaction may produce 
economy-wide consequences (Leijonhufvud, 1968), that is, mimic the real aggregate movements of the economy as 




management and organization theory is by definition a collective or firm-level discipline, and thus the key 
questions of interest should be pursued at this level (without consideration for other levels).  Or, second 
and conversely, the inherently pluralistic nature of management studies may preclude building specific 
micro-foundations, given the potential equivalency assigned to all levels. That is, no particular level 
deserves emphasis, and each level (for example - individual, organization, network, or industry) offers a 
different (though, as we will discuss, contradictory) and complementary approach to thinking about 
organizations and their performance. Or third and finally, the empirically driven character of strategic 
management perhaps crowds out this sort of methodological, theoretical, and philosophical inquiry.  
Whatever the reason for a lack of “micro-foundations project” in strategic management, and 
organizational analysis more generally, this paper is written with the belief that the time has come for 
opening a discussion that cuts across strategy, organization theory and management, and which centers on 
many of the issues that have been at stake in the classical discussions in social science and philosophy 
concerning levels and units of analysis (cf. Felin and Hesterly, 2006). Specifically, to broadly foreshadow 
both our underlying premise and conclusion, this essay begins with the following increasingly forgotten 
assumption (Felin and Foss, 2005). That is, organizations are made up of individuals, and there is no 
organization without individuals. There certainly seems to be nothing quite as elementary; yet, this 
elementary truth has been lost in the increasing focus on structure, routines, capabilities, culture, 
institutions, and various other collective conceptualizations ⎯ with rather negative consequences for 
theory-building, empirical work, and managerial practice. Our contribution then is to highlight the need to 
explain  the individual-level origins, or micro-foundations of collective structures as they arise from 
individual action and interaction, while extant work seems to take organization, and structure more 
generally, for granted. Furthermore, we delineate extant work in a succinct framework, and highlight 
promising future directions which take individual-level considerations, or micro-foundations, seriously.  
More generally, we outline three pillars of a rational choice program for management, by highlighting 
theoretical work in sociology and economics, in hopes of providing promising methodological and 
theoretical foundations for the next generation of management theory.   
We should note that our efforts here generally are complementary with quite recent calls for “micro-
foundations” and we specifically further build on this research project (e.g., Felin and Foss, 2005; Foss 
and Foss, 2005; Felin and Hesterly, 2006).
2  However, at the risk of repeating what has been published 
and said elsewhere, we focus on new issues and extensions that need further consideration and 
                                                           
2 Gavetti (2005) has also called for ’micro-foundations’ for management theory in a recent article, though 




clarification. The unique contribution of this chapter is to offer a systematic and thorough exposition, 
building on Coleman’s (1990) classic meta-theoretical discussion and his overall framework, specifically 
in applying the framework to the notion of organizational capabilities and highlighting extensions by way 
of calling for a rational choice program for strategic management and organization theory. 
This chapter is structured as follows. We begin by first briefly highlighting problems in the present work 
on organizational capabilities by providing a general conceptual figure illustrating critical questions 
which remain unanswered, specifically the lack of micro-foundations and causal mechanisms   
(Organizational Capabilities: A Lack of Micro-foundations).  As the general problems highlighted in this 
first section have recently, quite extensively, been discussed elsewhere (specifically see Felin and 
Hesterly, 2006; Felin & Foss, 2005), the section will remain purposefully succinct to avoid further 
repetition.  Next we position the above discussion and associated problems (lack of micro-foundations 
and causal mechanisms) in the context of a meta-theoretical discussion utilizing the general model of 
social explanation developed by the sociologist James Coleman (1990).  We consistently apply this 
framework throughout this paper (Metatheory: Mechanisms, Explanation and Analytical Levels). Our first 
use of the Coleman model is to show in which sense the recent emphasis on structure, capabilities, and the 
more general taken-for-grantedness of “organization,”  in management studies is a manifestation of 
methodological collectivism and why this is problematic (Organizational Capabilities and 
Methodological Collectivism). The second use of the Coleman model is to develop implications for 
research into the building of explicit micro-foundations for routines and capabilities.  We explicate 
important research issues in the building of micro-foundations for organization-level phenomena and 
outline desiderata for such theory-building. We furthermore argue that theory-building should be founded 
on rational choice theory rather than on theories of individual behaviour, which is reactive, routinized, 
etc.  We specifically highlight three key pillars of a rational choice research program, namely 1) 
rationality, 2) choice, and 3) causal mechanisms; thus providing the rough and preliminary foundations 
for a much-needed rational choice research program for management research.  Some concluding 
observations are made on building micro-foundations (Building Foundations: Implications for Research) 




Organizational Capabilities: A Lack of Micro-foundations 
Strategy scholars have converged on organizational capabilities as the key construct for the 
understanding of firm-level heterogeneity and performance (Eisenhardt and Martin 1999; Winter 2003).
3 
As suggested by Figure 1  – extant work has focused on making the link between organizational or firm-
level capabilities and collective-level outcomes (see dotted box in Figure 1).  A central argument of 
capabilities-based work is that organizational routines or capabilities are the fundamental units of 
analysis, and that the organization should be conceptualized as the central repository of routines and 
capabilities (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982). The extant organizational capabilities approach is explicit 
about the need to focus on the collective as the key level of analysis, which for us highlights the need for 
micro-foundations, providing us an important point of departure from extant work and the unique 
contribution of this chapter. As a brief example of the present emphasis on the collective, Zollo and 
Winter (2002) explicitly define capabilities as “learned and stable pattern of collective activity” (Zollo 
and Winter 2002: 340, emphasis added). The emphasis on collective constructs has lead to a 
corresponding neglect of the levels of individual action and interaction (Felin and Hesterly 2006; Felin 
and Foss 2005). As Argote and Ingram (2000: 156; emphasis added) lamented, to the extent that there has 
been progress in studying knowledge as the foundation of competitive advantage, “… it has been at the 
level of identifying consistencies in organizations’ knowledge development paths and almost never at the 
level of human interactions that are the primary source of knowledge and knowledge transfer.” However, 
neglecting this “primary source” means that we (strategic management and organizational scholars as 
well as managers that act on the prescriptions of the capabilities view) miss potentially important 
individual-level information.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Put differently, while links between organizational capabilities and outcomes have been made in extant 
work (see Figure 1), critical questions as to the underlying individual-level foundations and origins of 
these capabilities seem to be lacking. Two specific problems are worth highlighting in light of Figure 1 
(matters presently remaining outside of dotted box). First, while extant work has tended to, in effect, 
                                                           
3 Our arguments also apply to work that makes use of notions of routines, dynamic capabilities, competencies, core 




round out individuals from the analysis (Felin and Hesterly, 2006), can we theorize individual-level 
origins for collective constructs, in this case capabilities?  Second, an absolutely fundamental problem has 
arisen in the form of various theoretical “black boxes” in our theories.  Namely, how exactly do 
individual actions, abilities, and choices aggregate up to the collective level?  What are the underlying 
causal (and social) mechanisms?  These and other questions provide the general premise for our 
subsequent discussion. While our efforts here require a meta-theoretical (and perhaps metaphysical) 
detour of sorts into some key philosophical and ontological matters, we hope the reader will tolerate this, 
as these underlying questions are quite fundamental to strategic management and organization theory, and 
in large part, have been neglected. 
Metatheory: Mechanisms, Explanation and Analytical Levels 
Mechanisms and the Individual Level 
Any theoretical (and consequently empirical) effort to explain organizational phenomenon (the 
explanandum) has to make a choice (though the choice is often made only implicitly) that concerns the 
level at which explanation takes place, that is, the analytical level at which the important components of 
the explanans are located.  A classic distinction in social science research is made between the collective 
and the individual level. This question, of course, has divided disciplines, and even led to some of social 
science’s most infamous in-fighting (Hayek, 1943; Popper, 1957) in the form of the opposition between 
methodological individualism and methodological collectivism. Nonetheless the questions and concerns 
remain equally valid and applicable to not only social science in general, but strategic management and 
organizational studies specifically.  
We here take the position that the explanation of collective phenomena must ultimately be grounded in 
explanatory mechanisms that involve individual action and interaction, that is, methodological 
individualism (cf. Hayek, 1952; Ullman-Margalitt, 1978; Elster, 1989, 1998; Boudon, 1998a).
4 
                                                           
4 In its most extreme form, methodological individualism asserts that in explanations of social phenomena reference 
is allowed only to individuals, their properties and their (inter)actions. Thus, at no point in the explanation can 
reference be made to supra-individual entities as in any way causal agents.  No “shortcuts” by making reference to 
aggregates are allowed anywhere in the explanation. On this program, explaining, for example, the current strategy 
of Shell must always ultimately involve making reference to the mental states of all relevant organizational 
stakeholders and how these mental states produced particular actions that over time combined to produce current 
Shell strategy. If practicable, all explanation in such a scheme essentially becomes painstaking historical 
explanation.   However, obviously, this is a highly problematic research strategy, if taken to its logical conclusion. 
First, it runs into problem of historical regression, because it is not clear where the explanatory chain should stop. 
Second, it runs into a complexity problem associated with accounting for the mental states and actions of all relevant 
organizational stakeholders. As Hayek (1945) reminded us, these kind of “particular circumstances of time and 




Methodological individualism has been defended in numerous ways.  For example, it is sometimes 
defended by invoking a deeper argument of ontological individualism, according to which only 
individuals, and not collectives, are acting entities. While we have sympathy with this argument, our 
argument is rather epistemological.  We take it to be the ultimate aim of scientific endeavours in the 
social science domain to identify and theorize the causal social mechanisms ⎯ the “cogs and wheels” 
(Elster 1989: 3) ⎯ that generate and explain observed associations between events (Bhaskar,1978; 
Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998). We associate this view with scientific and methodological realism (Harré 
1970; Bhaskar 1978; Foss 1994). It differs from the traditional covering-law model of explanation of Carl 
Hempel and others, because the covering-law model does not imply an insistence on identifying genuine 
causality.  In contrast, causality is central in a mechanisms approach.  Thus, to the mechanism-oriented 
social scientist, the discovery of how human action and interaction causally produce collective level 
phenomena is what science is all about (e.g., Cowan and Rizzo, 1996).  
We also take it to be implicit in a mechanism-oriented scientific inquiry that explanatory black boxes be 
eschewed in principle. The modifier is necessary, because one reason for allowing some black boxes to 
enter explanation is explanatory parsimony (Hedström and Swedberg 1998:12; also see Coleman, 1990: 
16).
5 Economists and strategic management scholars perform somewhat related explanatory operations 
when they construct firm-level arguments. This type of shorthand can be permitted, as long as it is 
understood that it is nothing more than pragmatic shorthand. The problem in contemporary strategic 
management is that it is much too often forgotten that, for example, talk of firm-level capabilities is 
precisely that - explanatory shorthand for underlying individual-level action and interaction . Or, even 
more worrying, capabilities and similar constructs imply a break with the methodological individualism 
that we see as fundamentally aligned with a mechanism-based approach to explanation and an 
endorsement of methodological collectivism that is at variance with a focus on causal and social 
mechanisms in explanation.  
A General Model of Social Science Explanation  
To clarify and put notions such as methodological individualism and collectivism or “individual-level” 
and “collective level explanation,” into a broader and consistent perspective, consider Figure 2 which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
methodological individualism, but admit a role for collective concepts in explanation as in Agassi (1960).   
5 For example, under competitive conditions, decision-makers in firms only have a very limited feasible behavioural 
repertoire. If they do not choose an element of this set, they will not survive. Thus, a structure (i.e., competitive 
conditions) can substitute in an explanatory sense for a much more complicated explanation involving individual 




builds on the insightful conceptual model of the sociologist James Coleman (1990; also see Coleman, 
1986). Coleman’s conceptual model to our knowledge is the best and most concise effort to capture meta-
theoretical matters and problems relating to micro-macro relations, and levels more generally, and thus 
provides an apt unifying tool for our purposes (cf. Abell, 2003). The framework provides the general 
overall organizing focal point for much of our discussion, and will be briefly explicated.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
The figure begins from a distinction between the macro-level and the micro-level. For example, the 
macro-level may be the organizational level while the micro-level is the level of individuals. (Higher 
levels, such as networks, could perhaps also be discussed in conjunction with this framework, though for 
our purposes we focus on the individual as the micro-level and the organization as the macro-level). As 
shown, there are links between macro-macro (arrow 4) and macro-micro (arrow 1 and 5), micro-micro 
(arrow 2), and micro-macro (arrow 3).  The figure also makes a distinction, between what is to be 
explained (i.e., the explanandum, or, dependent variable) and that with which explanation takes place (the 
explanans, or, independent variables), as indicated by the direction of the arrows. Ultimately, the aim is to 
be able to explain some macro-level phenomenon (placed at the top-right corner).  In order to do so, the 
analyst must make use of theoretical mechanisms implied by the arrows. For example, he can use 
explanans that involve arrows 1, 2 and 3, which would be the choice of the rational choice social scientist. 
Or, he can make use of arrow 4 or 5, which would be the choice of the structural-functionalist 
sociologist.
6 
Coleman’s model implicitly builds on the mechanism-oriented approach to social science explanation that 
we have very briefly discussed (and will further explicate below).  The arrows in Figure 2 are boxes that, 
as it were, may be filled out with theoretical mechanisms that the analyst chooses. To put some brief 
explanatory meat on the bare bones of this framework, consider using the Coleman framework to analyze 
the effects on the use of a certain resource to an increase in the price of that resource. This type of analysis 
could begin with arrow 1, that is, from the impact that the economy-wide price of the relevant resource 
                                                           
6  We should note that arrow 5 is not in the Coleman (1990) formulation of the diagram.  It was suggested to us by 
Peter Abell. Arrow 5 allows for the direct influence of social structures on actions postulated in more extreme 
streams of sociology, such as structural functionalism. In these streams choice is not seen as an outcome of 
deliberation relative to constraints (i.e., arrow 2).  Thus, arrow 1 and 2 cannot fully capture such approaches to 




has on the decision situations of individual agents. The rise in price affects the economic conditions that 
decision makers face, and this gives rise to various adaptations, notably, less will be used of the now more 
expensive resource, by the individual (arrow 2), as well as on the (collective) level of the economy (arrow 
3). However, whether the decision-makers react in a maximizing or a bounded rational manner is not 
something the framework is explicit about.  And whether the adjustments that result in less of the input 
takes place through smooth rational processes of adaptation or through selection processes (i.e., those 
firms that do not use less of the now more expensive resource becomes less profitable and eventually are 
weeded out) is not something the framework says anything about either. Thus, the framework in itself 
produces few restrictions on the particular mechanisms that the analyst can choose.  
However, we argue that one crucial restriction can immediately be placed on the framework. Specifically, 
while the framework does indeed feature an arrow 4, that is, a mechanism or set of mechanisms that are 
solely located at the collective macro level, and makes no contact whatsoever with the level of individual 
action; this is included purely for illustrative purposes (i.e., for illustrating the explanatory approach of 
collectivist streams in social science). While we have no problems with placing the explanandum on the 
collective level, we reject the attempt to place all of the explanans on that level. The reason for this is that 
there are no conceivable mechanisms on the social domain that operate solely on the collective level. 
There simply are no mysterious macro-level entities directly producing macro-level outcomes. While this 
is how we may reason for purposes of shorthand (e.g., “aggregate investments drove much of last 
quarter’s growth in GNP”, “industry conditions determined the strategy of this strategic group” etc.), 
macro conditions (i.e., the top-left corner) only impact on macro outcomes (the top-right corner) 
indirectly, namely through mechanisms 1,2 and 3 (we suppress arrow 5 for the moment). The implication 
is that if an explanandum in the social science context is placed on the macro-level (top-right corner), 
explaining it means choosing explanans that make use of one of these three sets of  arrows (and their 
underlying mechanisms): [3], [2,3] or [1,2,3]. This is, however, an implication that is not reflected in 
much sociological work, and, unfortunately, also much work in management.    
Examples: Collectivism in Management Research 
Much social science research, including research in strategic management and organizational analysis, has 
however, rather unfortunately, operated on this level (that is, at the macro-macro, or arrow 4 level), with 
previous “social facts” determining future social facts. These social facts have taken on various labels ⎯ 
culture, structure, environment, institutions, and so forth ⎯ and are generally highlighted as the key 




and learning). Much of sociology indeed explicitly builds on models which operate only at the social fact 
and collective level (cf. Boudon, 2004).
7 For example, institutional theory heavily emphasizes the role of 
exogenous, taken-for-granted institutions in determining organizational structure (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). The causal modelling explicitly focuses only on arrow 4-type explanations; thus, collective myths 
(in the form of, for example, pre-existing structures) are adopted given the need to establish legitimacy, in 
short, social facts determine social facts. Or, to put it differently, overwhelming environmental 
uncertainly leads organizations to imitate structures and strategies of others and to take on the form of 
their immediate environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Another example of macro-macro type explanations is much of the capabilities approach in strategic 
management (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997), and more specifically the work 
originating in organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982; cf Felin and Foss, 2006). This literature 
asserts that performance differences between firms are driven by efficiency differences that may 
somehow be ascribed to collective constructs, such as routines, capabilities, competencies, and the like 
(also see Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). In all of this, virtually no reference is made to individual 
action and interaction (as noted by Felin and Hesterly, 2006, in fact, individual essentially are assumed to 
be homogeneous and randomly distributed). In fact, while Nelson and Winter (1982: 72) make a 
metaphorical link between individual skills and organizational routines, this analysis explicitly remains at 
the level of a metaphor, and more generally dismisses with individual-level explanation.  Nelson and 
Winter of course recognize that they are making strong abstractions in emphasizing the collective level 
(over the individual), and even highlight that they are not completely happy with the choice (1982: 83), 
but nonetheless in its present form capabilities remain defined as collective-level constructs, independent 
of individuals (Zollo and Winter, 2002).   
More generally, there are two sets of theoretical mechanisms linking individuals, capabilities and firm-
level outcomes that are unaccounted for in the capabilities approach as presently conceptualized (see 
Figure 3).   
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
                                                           
7 Even much of mainstream economics is not always immune from methodological collectivism. As Austrian school 
economists have argued for years (e.g., Lachmann 1973), much of macroeconomics was, and to some extent still is, 




As indicated by the Figure, neither the mechanisms linking individual actions to capabilities, nor the 
mechanisms linking capabilities to organizational-level outcomes have been satisfactorily identified. The 
former mechanism concerns how capabilities originate from individual actions and interaction (cf. Felin 
and Foss, 2005). We are not aware of a single contribution to strategic management or organizational 
theory that convincingly shows how organization-level capabilities may emerge from individual actions 
and interaction.  A similar problem arises in connection with the link from capabilities to organization-
level outcomes, such as competitive advantage. Superior routines or capabilities or dynamic capabilities 
are somehow postulated to be the direct cause of such outcomes. Such notions are labels for sequences of 
individual actions that are postulated to fit into patterns that are organization-specific and repetitive (Dosi 
et al. 1999). However, all the emphasis is on the postulated pattern rather than on why individual actions 
taken together should produce patterns (and continue to produce and reproduce such patterns).  To 
understand this would require that analysis began from considering the individual, for example, looking at 
what it is that incentivizes or motivates individuals to take those actions that are consistent with routinized 
behaviour.  However, this issue is deliberately suppressed by Nelson and Winter (they simply assume that 
routines represent truces – 1982: 107), and by subsequent writers in the capabilities view.   Effectively, 
individual action is blackboxed in these approaches.  
If pressed on the issue of the missing individual, these kinds of approaches will often formally recognize 
that individuals of course are present.  However, the response effectively takes place by introducing a 
fifth explanatory mechanism, pictured as arrow 5 in Figure 2. This goes directly from collective 
structures, institutions, etc. to individual behaviour.
8 Thus, individuals are formally recognized but they 
are portrayed as mere “actors” that embody the role that is dictated by the collective-level environment (as 
in structural-functionalism).  From a methodological individualist perspective, this does not amount to 
building satisfactory micro-foundations, as any individual-level considerations are superseded by such 
factors as culture, and environment, routines, capabilities, etc. That is, while individuals and managers 
certainly do get mentioned in the theoretical development, nevertheless the assumption is that 
heterogeneity in collective context, environment, and situation drives organizational-level, as well as, 
individual-level outcomes (if indeed the latter mechanism is considered at all).  
In short, in collectivist approaches, micro-foundations are missing, as questions such as, where structure 
                                                           
8 While the methodological individualist does not deny that institutions (e.g., the law, incentive systems, etc.) 
influence human actions, he will balk at the way in which the mechanism implied by arrow 5 portrays actors as 
puppets that are somehow being directly manipulated by overall societal forces, and will insist on the higher degree 
of voluntarism implied by the use of mechanisms contained in arrows 1 and 2 (i.e., institutions matter to individual 




originates from in the first place (arrow 3, Figure 2/3), why certain collective structures are adopted, and 
what are the underlying individual-level considerations (arrows 2 and 3), remain unanswered in theorizing 
that solely remains at the collective-level.  Institutional theories are an apt example of arrow 1, 4 and 
perhaps 5-type explanations, and they have also increasingly been utilized in strategic management 
research (e.g., Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Oliver, 1997), they are nonetheless only one example of this 
type of explanation.  
While we are admittedly painting with a quite broad brush, more generally behavioural models also place 
similar, strong causal, emphasis on various higher-level facts (generally, “the environment”) determining 
lower-level individual behaviour (for quite explicit links between sociological and behavioural theories 
see e.g., Homans, 1974 or Hummell and Opp, 1968). The key independent variables and causal factors of 
behavioural models include “the environment,” various external stimuli, or more generally cultural 
arguments. For example, in Cyert and March’s classic Behavioral Theory of the Firm, significant 
emphasis is given to the environment as the determining factor of organizational (and implicitly 
individual) behaviour (also see Bromiley, 2005), and further behavioural antecedents are found in 
Simon’s work, which argues that most individual and organizational behavior can be traced to some kind 
of “environmental stimulus” (March and Simon, 1958: 139).  March and Simon (1958: 141-142) further 
place emphasis not only on environmental stimuli, but also on situations and associated programmatic and 
routine behaviour in organizations.  However, the older behavioralist school (i.e., March and Simon, 
Cyert and March) emphasizes the starting point of the individual (thus giving considerations to arrows 1, 
2 though perhaps not 3), even if this was an individual strongly influenced by environmental stimuli.  We 
are concerned that this emphasis has vanished almost entirely in more recent work, as more recent 
behavioural approaches seem to have moved much more toward a strong environmental (and related 
cultural) argument (Greve, 2003).   
More generally our arguments in terms of the Coleman diagram and its applications both to strategic 
management specifically, and organizational analysis more generally are captured in Table 1. Table 1 is 
simply a summary of our arguments, and we will use it as a further organizing tool for this section, though 
will not refer to it subsequently.     
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 




emphasis to arrows 1, 4 and 5 generally do not give causal consideration to lower levels, in fact even 
completely disregarding them, as lower levels inherently are determined by higher level causes.  An apt 
way to summarize the theoretical emphasis in arrow 1-type explanation is the notion of “organizations as 
strong situations” (Davis-Blake and Pfeffer, 1989; also see Pfeffer, 1997). Thus, contextual and 
environmental factors receive significant emphasis as the predominent theoretical engines. The general 
questions of interest focus on determining what these contextual factors are and how they cause individual 
behavior.  Cultural arguments most obviously are emphasized in this type of analysis. Arrow 1, 4 and 5 
type explanations are so pervasive in both strategic management and organizational analysis that any 
questioning of their validity may seem suspect to most scholars, but we will nonetheless argue that 
emphasis in these areas is misplaced as micro-level explanations inherently are more theoretically sound.  
Or, to make the preceding sentence less controversial, it seems that arrow 3-type, micro-foundational 
explanation has been neglected relative to macro-foundational work.  While we have emphasized research 
in organizational analysis, which gives emphasis to arrow 1, 4 and 5 type explanations, strategic 
management similarly makes strong assumptions about the need to place emphasis on explanation at 
these, higher levels. For example, organizational culture is one explanatory variable often cited in the 
resource based view as a key source of competitive advantage (e.g., Barney, 1986). More generally, 
Henderson and Cockburn (1994), in an article which has been highlighted as one of the key (both 
theoretical and empirical) works in the resource-based view (Barney, 2001; for further discussion see 
Felin and Hesterly, 2006), explicit emphasis is placed on various organizational factors as the 
determinants of individual-level outcomes (that is, arrow 1-type explanation). Much of the literature on 
organizational capabilities also places heavy emphasis higher levels such as networks and alliances as the 
key determinants capabilities and outcomes (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  Thus, in strategic management there 
is similarly a strong emphasis on arrow 4 and 5 type explanations.   
Finally, knowledge, capabilities, and associated resource-based arguments have also placed some 
emphasis on arrow 2-type explanations. Arrow 2 explanations focus on individual interaction and 
associated outcomes. For example, March (1991) in his classic simulation of organizational learning 
focuses on interaction and socialization as the key determinant to individual and consequently 
organizational learning.  While interaction and socialization certainly seem like plausible theoretical 
mechanisms, how and why exactly interaction or socialization causes learning remains unaddressed.   
Some Reasons Why Micro-foundations Are Critical  
The above discussion and present arguments in strategic management and organization theory raise more 




tipped our hand in terms of the type of explanation that we advocate, though a more formal discussion we 
believe is instructive. Coleman (1990: 1-23), in similar fashion, in a meta-theoretical discussion asks 
whether social science explanation should start with collective and external, and individual-level and 
internal explanations.  Insights may perhaps be drawn from both perspectives, but given the need for 
theoretical parsimony, and as a first approximation, which approach is more persuasive and theoretically 
(and methodologically) sound. Coleman gives three reasons why individual-level, internal explanation is 
theoretically more robust, and we further extend these insights into strategic management and 
organization theory. That is, using the Coleman framework as a tool, we highlight why micro-level 
explanation improves on collective-level explanation.  We discuss three reasons and explicate them 
further below.  First, observations, and quite importantly, interventions, are more naturally made at lower, 
individual levels (rather than higher levels, if at all possible). This argument implicitly appeals to the kind 
of mechanism-based oriented explanation that we alluded to earlier (and will discuss further below) and 
more generally provides for a more practical and humanistic approach to theorizing given the more ready 
prescriptions (cf. Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998). Second, collective level explanations leave theories 
open for alternative explanations. That is, individual-level factors may precede collective facts which may 
subsequently be presupposed by theorists, which however inherently mis-specifies collective models.   
Third and finally, individual-level explanations are more stable as organizations inherently are resultant of 
the actions of component parts, that is, individuals.  We will briefly discuss each of the above reasons in 
turn below. 
Observation and Interventions Made at Lower Level 
The question of intervention provides an interesting challenge to collective level theories, how 
specifically would an organization for example develop a capability (or more generally change)? Scholars 
have recently in fact posed this question, and again the theory inevitably relies on individual-level factors, 
but in so doing creates a data-theory disconnect as the theory remains at the collective level, but 
underlying observations and potential interventions at the individual level.  For example, Song et al 
(2003) argue and show that capabilities can be developed by hiring particular individuals from other 
organizational settings, thus questioning the “collective status” of capabilities in the first place. More 
loosely, if we were to observe any organization, we inherently would be observing specific individuals, 
rather than the whole of the organization in any meaningful way.  This of course gets lost in the broad 
general use of aggregate and organizational-level language and empirical data showing various financial 
and strategic actions of firms over time, but explicating the underlying abilities and motivations of the 





An explanation based on internal analysis [individual and micro-foundations] of system 
[organization] behaviour in terms of action and orientations of lower-level units is likely to be more 
stable and general than explanation which remains at the system level.  Since the system’s 
behaviour is in fact resultant of the actions of its component parts, knowledge of how the actions of 
these parts combine to produce systematic behaviour can be expected to give greater predictability 
than will statistical relations of surface characteristics of the system”  
 
Obviously, this is not to say that aggregate data cannot be used, but when making strong theoretical 
statements based on “reduced form” correlations at these high levels of aggregations, strategic 
management scholars should be aware of the nested individual action and interaction that generally gets 
lost in the process. The available data in effect begins to drive the theoretical development, rather than the 
other way around, and more importantly, as argued by Coleman, more robust theories of collectivise are 
developed by starting at the lower level.   
More generally, the matter of intervention provides a rather stringent, further litmus test for matters such 
as organizational change.  Hypothetically, if we wanted to radically (to use an extreme case to highlight) 
intervene in an organizational setting to change it (whether strategy or structure, and associated 
performance outcomes), it would seem logical that the most radical forms of change would involve 
changes in the underlying individuals who make up the organization.  Management practice of course 
seems to verify the logical intuition behind the link between the need to focus on individuals in 
organizational intervention, for example, in cases of top management team turnover and more generally in 
matters such as hiring and retention. Interventions thus, while perhaps generally applicable to the 
organization as a whole, in effect are as good as, and effective as, the underlying response at the lower, 
individual level.  This “other side” of capabilities, perhaps even the ‘soft underbelly’ of capabilities (given 
the lack of work in this domain), seems largely unexplored as emphasis remains at organization-level 
practices (cf. Henderson & Cockburn, 1994) rather than their individual-level origins and the underlying 
characteristics and choices of the individuals responding to potential higher level organizational practices. 
Alternative Explanations 
In offering only a collective level approach of organizational capabilities, many alternative explanations 
from lower levels are quite readily apparent. The capabilities literature in fact has recently begun to note 
this problem, as scholars point to the capabilities themselves being rooted in specific individuals, rather 




is whether the mobility of particular individuals (Felin and Hesterly, 2006) leads to the respective 
knowledge decay or building. Early contributions to the organizational capabilities literature in passing 
even note that individual-level alternative explanations are quite readily apparent (Henderson and 
Cockburn 1994: 79-80), though subsequent theorizing and empirical work has taken a quite strong 
collective stance.  The one specific mechanism that these ideas suggest is that ”more capable” individuals 
may create and self-select into particular organizational settings (cf. Stern, 2004), and thus as collective 
work generally does not (or is not able to) control for individual-level a priori factors.  Specifically, the 
underlying assumption is that individuals are randomly distributed (and thus can essentially be treated as 
homogeneous) into organizational settings thus warranting the emphasis on heterogeneous collective 
practices. Thus, in terms of our Figures, emphasis remains on the mechanisms in arrow 1, 4  and 5 type, 
though underlying micro-foundations as to the origins of practices remain unexplored. Put in light of 
Figure 2, focusing on arrow 2 and 3-type explanations may provide underlying micro-foundations for 
explaining the origin and development of organizational capabilities, for example, by addressing such 
important questions as: Who is attracted to a particular organizational setting and why, what 
characteristics and abilities do they bring to the setting?
9  
Organizations and Strategies Resultant of Individuals 
A final point, closely related to the above, supporting the need for individual-level theories and micro-
foundations is the fact that any collective structure is fundamentally resultant of individual-level actions 
and composition. That is, we logically cannot conceive of “organization” without the individuals that 
make it up. This upward relationship thus suggests that some emphasis should be placed on factors related 
to processes of “organizing,” that is who and why certain individual organize (cf. Olson, 1971).   Despite 
well-known warnings of problems associated with anthropomorphizing, there is still quite a bit of action 
and behaviour attributed to the organization itself, rather than the individuals, which comprise the 
collective.   
.  Many behavioural models of organization theory and strategic management ascribe overwhelming 
importance to the environment, particularly in more recent formulations (e.g., Bromiley, 2005; Greve, 
2003).  While we do not want to rule out the kind of mechanisms indicated by arrow 1 in Figure 2, we 
stress that strategic management inherently is interested in purposeful action on the part of managers, and 
                                                           
9 This brings self-selection into the picture (cf. Felin and Hesterly 2005).  An explanation of organizational 
heterogeneity in terms of self-selection may abstract completely from interaction among individuals and the possibly 
“emergent” effects thereof.   In this explanation organizational capability is a genuine epiphenomenon of individual 





we cannot therefore from this perspective let managers be mere puppets at the mercy of aggregate   
“environmental” or collective forces.  Similarly, in capabilities work on the theory of the firm, that has 
taken its inspiration from Nelson and Winter (1982), there is a strong underlying argument that routines 
and capabilities very strongly influence individual actions (arrow 5 in Figure 2).  Unfortunately, this 
leaves it unclear how routines and capabilities originates and change as a result of individual action and 
interaction (the left hand arrow in Figure 1) (cf. Felin and Foss, 2005).  Besides, while routine behaviour 
may perhaps dominate the organizational landscape (Nelson and Winter, 1982), it nevertheless does not 
necessarily follow that this routine behaviour is what deserves the most emphasis in theoretical work, nor 
does it follow that routines automatically are the key source of what differentiates firms.   
More General Arguments 
It is quite arguable that the capabilities approach and other collectivist currents in contemporary 
management thought are founded on an implicit assumption of strong individual homogeneity and 
malleability by heterogeneous context, situation, and surroundings (for this argument, see Felin and 
Hesterly, 2006). If such malleability indeed is the case (linked with the associated assumption of the 
random distribution of individuals), then individuals can in effect be rounded out, as they simply 
passively “mediate” the causal mechanisms going from collective constructs such as capabilities to 
collective outcomes. Individuals are not ⎯ strictly speaking ⎯ left out of the explanation; they are just 
not very important, and primary emphasis can be placed on the collective level. Little would be lost of the 
explanation if it was simply to take place in terms of the mechanisms represented by arrows 4 or 5 in 
figure 2 (rather than in terms of arrows, 1,2 and 3). However, arguing that individuals a priori are 
homogeneous and malleable directly conflicts with established theoretical and empirical arguments from 
the cognitive sciences emphasizing the role of a priori knowledge (Spelke et al., 1992).  In short, 
individuals clearly bring abilities and propensities with them into organizational settings (Arrow 3 in 
Figure 2), which strongly influence which outcomes can be realized. Such underlying factors are 
marginalized by the preoccupation with the overwhelming determinance of pre-existing structure. 
On the other hand, arguing that individuals are heterogeneous does not imply that the collective level is 
non-existent or unimportant. Rather, it suggests the importance of explicitly linking the individual and the 
collective levels, that is, in unveiling the mechanisms represented by at least arrow 3 in figure 1, and 
possibly also arrows 1, and 2. As indicated already, overall surprisingly little serious analytical attention 
has been dedicated to this task, although a few scholars have strived valiantly to establish the relevant 
links (e.g., Argote 1999).  In the following, we outline research implications of a micro-foundations 




Building Micro-Foundations: Implications for Research 
Building Bridges Between Levels 
Unfortunately, the general methodological individualist admonition that aggregate phenomena ultimately 
be accounted for in terms of individual action and interaction leaves open exactly what “action” and 
“interaction” means. The purpose of the following is to identify and discuss in some detail the set of 
mechanisms at various levels (including behavioural assumptions) that is relevant for building 
foundations for routines and capabilities.  Furthermore, the discussion will show how the choice of such 
foundations is influenced by how capabilities are conceptualized, whether the starting point is in a homo 
oeconomicus model or a homo sociologicus model of behaviour, etc. Thus, we shall seek to identify 
possible research strategies, and identify the available conceptual toolbox. 
Underlying psychological assumptions and models of human nature are absolutely fundamental to 
theorizing for strategic management and organizational scholars, as these assumptions provide the 
foundation for much of what can subsequently be said and theoretically developed (March and Simon, 
1958: 9-11; also see Simon, 1985: 303). Unfortunately, these underlying assumptions often receive little 
attention, perhaps given the immediate need to get to the business of organization-level theorizing.  
However, equally important is how to build from the individual (micro) level to the organizational 
(macro) level, that is, to theorize the mechanisms implied by arrow 3 in Figures 2 and 3. This has 
traditionally been a troublesome part of the social sciences (cf. Hayek 1937; Arrow, 1951; Coleman 
1990). As already mentioned, the “bridging” becomes simple if all individuals are assumed to be 
essentially homogenous. Strikingly, this explanatory trick is characteristic of both (formal) economics and 
(functional-structuralist) sociology, though otherwise the two disciplines or theories are quite obviously 
completely different. To the sociologist, the assumption of homogeneity is a license to let all behaviour be 
influenced and formed by structures. To the economist, the assumption of homogeneity is useful because 
it allows him to take one agent as representative of the whole economy and treat the allocational decisions 
of this single agent as a representation of the aggregate allocation problem. Both procedures strongly 
reduce the complexity of the analytical problem of showing how individual action and interaction 
produces aggregate phenomena.  
However, both approaches, while often utilized in organizational analysis, fundamentally trivialize the 
problem of understanding how organization-level phenomena, such as capabilities, originate from the 
actions and interactions of heterogeneous individuals (or how these capabilities are changed or 




economist, it is a too strong an affront to realism for most purposes of management theory to take the 
behaviour of organization X to be fully represented by the actions of a “representative employee” NN. 
Abstracting from assumptions about individuals and how they interact gets us dangerously close to the 
untenable kind of collectivist explanation represented by arrow 4 in Figure 2. This reasoning results in our 
first implication for research:  
Research Implication 1: Building micro-foundations for organizational phenomena, such 
as  organizational capabilities (explanandum,) implies that explicit assumptions be made 
about both how individuals and their interaction (explanans) produces the explanandum .At 
a minimum the micro-foundations therefore involve identifying mechanisms that are 
represented by arrow 3 in Figure 2.  
Thus, the micro-foundations project would usually seem to involve two demanding undertakings: First, 
making assumptions about individuals (e.g., nature see Simon, 1985: 303), and second, given these 
assumptions, exploring the action and interaction of individuals to see if the explanandum can 
conceivably be produced as a  result of this interaction. For example, the “no fat” modelling methodology 
of game theory (Rasmussen, 1989) prescribes making the minimal (but precise) assumptions about 
rationality, information, and interaction that makes it possible for the analyst to derive the explanandum 
as an endogenous outcome of rational actions in equilibrium.  Theorizing arrow 3 may be highly 
complicated.  Or it may be conceptually simpler particularly when the explanandum is an outcome of 
willed, rational design.  For example, the existence of organizational incentive system may be explainable 
in terms of a CEO or top management team designing and implementing the system.  However, even the 
best designed system is almost bound to produce unforeseen effects at the organizational level. Whether 
these are effective to the organization also depends on the information, rationality and motivation of the 
CEO, and of course, the underlying abilities and motivation (perhaps intrinsic) of the employees 
themselves.  At any rate, individual and organizational levels remain connected.  A critical matter in 
building bridges between levels (above discussion), is the mode of theoretical explanation utilized, which 
we discuss next.   
Mode of Explanation  
As a general matter, theory formation, and the formulation of strategies for theory formation, is strongly 
influenced by the mode of explanation that is dominant in a given scientific field (Elster 1983: 16-17). A 
classic distinction is between intentional (i.e., explaining a phenomenon solely in terms of the intentional 




phenomenon (e.g., a social institution) brings to the group where the phenomenon is present), and causal 
explanation (i.e., explaining in terms of cause and effect) (Elster 1983). Some types of explanation in 
social science mix these three; for example, an invisible hand explanation (Ullman-Margalitt 1978) mixes 
intentional and causal explanation, and an evolutionary explanation may include these two as well, in 
addition to elements of functional explanation.
10  
Which mode of explanation does the organizational capabilities view apply (or imply)? To the extent that 
explanation by means of this approach proceeds solely on the macro level (arrow 4), some kind of causal 
explanation would seem to be the mode that is applied (i.e., capabilities directly cause, e.g., superior, 
firm-level performance). However, it is possible to give a somewhat different account of explanation 
within the capabilities approach, one that harmonizes with the heavy sociology content in this approach. 
In this account, the capabilities approach is heavily functionalist. Thus, capabilities and routines exist 
within specific firms because of their beneficial effects for these firms; however, the specific linkages 
between those capabilities/routines and their effects are not understood or at least not well understood by 
agents. As a huge literature on scientific explanation has clarified, functional explanation is highly 
questionable, because the feedback links between the effects of an aggregate entity (e.g., a routine) and 
the entity itself are seldom if ever specified. Such links, to the extent that they can be identified, must 
exist on the micro-level, that is, involve arrows 1, 2 and 3 in figure 3 ⎯ which leads back to the issue of 
individual action and interaction. This reasoning suggests the point – inherent in our emphasis on 
mechanisms ⎯  that there is a strong causal dimension to the micro-foundations project: Building from 
individual actions to organizational outcomes involves causal links that should be specified and theorized.  
Research Implication 2: Building micro-foundations for organizational capabilities must 
generally avoid functionalist explanation, but (in line with the emphasis on mechanisms) 
must make use of causal explanation.  
Fundamental Choices in Theory-Building: Making Assumptions About Human Agency  
As a general matter, micro-foundations in management can take many different forms.  We agree that it is 
possible to build a kind of micro-foundations from a sociological and/or behavioural starting point (e.g., 
                                                           
10 Taken as a whole, management studies have traditionally made use of all three modes of explanation.  However, 
typically those parts of management studies that are heavily influenced by economics (e.g., strategic management, 
corporate governance, organizational design) have made heavy use of intentional explanation while those parts (e.g., 
work on organizational culture, population ecology, the new institutionalism in organizational analysis) that are 





Gavetti 2005) just as a rational choice approach, more akin to economics, is also possible as micro-
foundation (and we shall advocate this later).  However, there are wide-ranging implications of theoretical 
choices made on this level (cf. Simon 1985).  They influence how organization-level phenomena can be 
conceptualized and explained.  
On a very basic level, there is a crucial choice to be made between a  homo oeconomicus or a homo 
sociologicus model of behaviour.
11 The choice that is made at this level conditions to a large extent what 
is further assumed about the rationality, information and foresight of the agent or actors.  Thus, if the 
choice is the homo oeconomicus model (and standard economic modelling methodology), assumptions 
are typically made that agents possess very considerable foresight (sometimes even perfect foresight) and 
can make perfectly rational decisions, no matter the informational circumstances. All versions of the 
paradigmatic expected utility model make such assumptions. Homo sociologicus is, in contrast, stuck 
with roles and norms that directly shape behaviour (i.e., Arrow 5 in Figure 1). As many have observed, 
the demands placed on the actor are much smaller than those placed on its related, though extremely 
distant, theoretical cousin, homo sociologicus.  
The chosen model of behaviour is also closely connected to the applied mode of explanation. That is, if 
agents are equipped with a high degree of foresight and information asymmetries are insignificant, it is 
hard to make room for unintended consequences; this effectively eliminates functional explanation, 
invisible hand explanation and also evolutionary explanations.  This connects to how phenomena on the 
organizational level are conceptualized.  Strongly “rational” behavioural models (e.g., the maximization 
model of the economist) often suggests that organization-level phenomena are consciously and rationally 
designed (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Thus, the mechanism is pure intentional design. Behavorial 
work, in contrast, will typically emphasize the “emergent” or partly “hidden” nature of organization-level 
phenomena, such as routines or capabilities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al., 1999). The mode of 
explanation employed by such work will typically be functionalist; that is, the existence of routines, 
capabilities, culture, etc. in an organization. is “explained” in terms of its beneficial consequences for the 
organization, but there is no attempt to identify the mechanisms that show how these routines, etc. are 
produced and reproduced by individuals.   
However, it is possible to assert that individuals act in a rational manner, yet organization-level 
phenomena are not necessarily designed, but “spontaneously emerge” (Hayek, 1973; Schotter, 1981; 
                                                           
11  Admittedly, this is a stark contrast, which neglects that there are intermediate positions (e.g., Lindenberg 1988 
and Boudon 1998b).  The discussion is also somewhat hampered by the fact that there is no homo sociologicus 




Sugden, 1986).  They are “the results of human action, but not of human design” (Hayek, 1973) and their 
explanation takes place in terms of “invisible hand explanation” (Ullman-Margalitt, 1978; for a list of 
examples of invisible hand explanations, see Nozick, 1974: 20-21).  Invisible hand explanations may take 
a number of forms, but common to them is that they belong to the category of what Hempel (1965: 447) 
calls “genetic explanation,” which “… present[s] the phenomenon under study as a final stage of a 
developmental sequence, and accordingly account for the phenomenon by describing the successive 
stages of that sequence.” More specifically, such explanation explains the explanandum as the unintended 
(and perhaps even unforeseen, cf. Ullman-Margalitt, 1978) outcome of the interaction of many 
intentionally acting agents. This is a mode of explanation that has seldom been explicitly applied in 
management.  Yet, we conjecture that this mode of explanation is one that should apply fairly broadly: 
Complex organizations manifest both highly intentional and rational behaviour and unanticipated 
consequences thereof.    
Research Implication 3: From the perspective of building micro-foundations for organizational 
phenomena invisible hand explanations are attractive because they combine the intentional (level 
of individual) with the causal (interaction among individuals) mechanisms, and seem to capture 
essential characteristics of complex organizations.   
However, invisible hand explanations are consistent with a fairly broad set of assumptions with respect to 
behaviour.  The paradigmatic use of these explanations is, of course, in economics: Overall patterns of 
allocation and distribution in markets emerge “as if by an invisible hand.” The behavioural assumption 
that usually drives economics is, of course, maximizing rationality, but invisible hand explanations are 
fully consistent with various behavioural approaches or with approaches that make only minimal 
assumptions on intention and rationality (e.g., Alchian 1950).  In the following section, however, we 
argue that the most satisfactory and fruitful behavioural assumptions can be found in rational choice 
theory.  
A Rational Choice Program for Management?  Three Pillars 
By way of linking our efforts (and early prescriptions for the future) to existing streams of research, there 
are quite promising strains of sociological (and economics) research, which, while not pervasive in 
management, explicitly argue for the need for micro-foundations and the need to make the micro-macro 
link (e.g., Boudon, 1998a; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; Olson, 1971; Schelling, 1978).  This rational 
choice program, while in part marginalized in sociology, nonetheless of late has received some significant 




suggests, the two key pillars of this approach emphasize first, rationality on the part of individuals, and 
second, choice.  A third fundamental pillar is that of “causal mechanisms,” which we also discuss 
(building on earlier discussions).  We highlight the implications of each of these three pillars, specifically 
emphasizing some very promising theoretical work which we believe can provide the foundations for 
further theory development by scholars in strategic management and organization theory.  We explicate 
these three key pillars of the rational choice program as, to our knowledge, this research program has not 
(at least in any meaningful or direct way) entered our conversations in management, despite its promise to 
solve many of the problems we have highlighted in this article.   
Rationality.  The emphasis in extant behavioural approaches again is on the determinacy of various 
external factors, and the past, on learning and decision-making (or, arrow 1 and 4-type explanations - e.g., 
Levitt and March, 1988), while the rationality assumption rather focuses on individuals as actors capable 
of reason, predictions, and common sense. While there has been a remarkably programmatic effort in 
behavioural and sociological approaches to denigrate any forethought or reason on the part of actors (see 
Rosenberg, 1995 for an excellent overview), even going as far back as Comte, nonetheless more recent  
research suggests that individuals in fact are quite “smart” and rational in how they approach and learn in 
unpredictable environments (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). That is, the present theoretical emphasis on poor 
judgements on the part of individuals (e.g., biases), which in fact has coloured much of our research even 
in strategic management, has been challenged by scholars who find that individuals are rational given the 
information that is available in various decision-making situations.  In fact, a stunning conclusion might 
be that biases and errors are simply made by scholars (in their theorizing), and not the subjects they study 
(see Stanovich and West, 2000 for an excellent discussion).  This new-found rationality has important 
implications for organizational research, as our models still strongly emphasize “boundedness,” rather 
than rationality.  Extant organizational work emphasizes legitimacy and imitation, while more rational 
approaches suggest that individuals are quite deliberate and purposeful in their actions.  While notions of 
deliberateness have recently been alluded to in the literature on organizational capabilities (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002), significantly more work is needed in truly anchoring these arguments into robust 
theoretical work in disciplines such as psychology and cognitive science, and more generally, we believe 
that much of the collectivist (and perhaps behavioural) baggage is best discarded as the present efforts to 
continuously amend the overall theoretical approaches are doomed to fail and result in an incoherent 
patchwork of ad-hoc explanations.   
Choice.  The second key pillar of a rational choice research program is choice.  There is very little 




emphasized presently.  Choice suggests an overall logic of intentionality, which is lacking in behavioural 
arguments.  Furthermore, choice-based models and associated invisible-hand explanations have provided 
quite powerful micro-macro links in some quarters of social science (e.g., Schelling, 1978).  The question 
of choice in fact suggests that we in effect begin our analysis with the ”lone” individualand from there 
build a theoretical model by first specifying our assumptions about individuals by highlighting their 
interests, capabilities and goals, (rather than ascribing them to the organization) and then further explicate 
the underlying mechanisms of the organizing process (Olson, 1971).
 12   In fact, the process of self-
selection, rather than the presently assumed random distribution of individuals (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994), we think provides a very powerful micro-macro link or social mechanism, which deserves 
significantly more emphasis.  Scott Stern in fact recently, while not theoretically anchoring his arguments 
in the language of ”micro-foundations,” nonetheless points to the powerful role of individuals deciding, 
choosing and creating environments (also see Zenger, 1994).  By way of further examples of promising 
theoretical work for management scholars to build on, the work of Olson (1971) and Brennan and 
Buchanan (1985) begins with the very approach suggested in this chapter, though at different levels of 
analysis, but nonetheless providing broad guidance for the type of approach advocated in this chapter.   
The choice aspect of the research program we are advocating here furthermore is also grounded in a 
“humanistically congenial image of man” (Coleman, 1990: 4).  That is, rather than impute causation to 
external and collective factors such as the environment, situation, or organization; the emphasis is placed 
on individual-level factors and choices. This emphasis on choice comes in stark contrast to many who are 
calling for further institutional (e.g., Oliver, 1997) and behavioural (Bromiley, 2005) foundations for 
strategic management. That is, we call for a radically different rational choice approach, which 
emphasizes internal, individual-level factors, or, micro-foundations.  This more internal approach we 
believe also is more congenial with the general mandate of strategic management to focus on managerial 
action and choices, even prescriptions, rather than highlighting the inevitable forces which may impose on 
a manager or firm.  While various external ”inevitabilities” may, and certainly do exist, it would seem that 
the key differentiating factors lie in internal, individual-level factors.  The focus from a choice-type 
                                                           
12 Coleman relatedly makes the following point (noting the ‘errors’ and trade-offs that are made in theorizing): “In 
this paper, I will proceed in precisely the opposite fashion to that taken by the advocates of homo sociologicus. I will 
make an opposite error, but one which may prove more fruitful. I want to begin the development of a theory of 
collective decisions, and in so doing I will start with an image of man as wholly free: unsocialized, entirely self-
interested, not constrained by norms of a system, but only rationally calculating to further his own interest. This is 
much the image of man held by economists, and with it the economists have answered one part of Hobbes’s 
question: how is it that although the men who make it up are wholly self-interested, the economic system can 
operate with one man’s actions benefiting others. It was the genius of Adam Smith to pose an answer to this part of 




perspective then highlights rational reason, rather than, the devil made me do it”/external-type 
explanations.   
Causal Mechanisms.  Various definitions of causal or social mechanisms have been offered in the social 
sciences (see Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; Mahoney, 2003 for an overview), though the central gist of 
this work has been to call for explicit links between micro and macro levels.  While there are some fine-
grained differences between definitions, they all call for explanatory and causal understanding (rather 
than citing correlations) regarding how specifically individual actions, choices, and interactions aggregate 
to the collective level (Elster, 1989), and as a secondary exercise, how the macro-levels subsequently 
interrelate back to micro-levels (though without deteriorating into ‘Giddensian’ notions of mutual 
instantiation). While social science in general, management included, has done an admirable job with the 
latter, relating macro-levels to the micro, the work calling for causal mechanisms emphasizes the critical 
need to first explain the origin of macro-structures as the result of individual actions, rather than take 
them for granted.  In short, the hard theoretical work is left undone, as management theories simply 
assume the existence of the very structures they seek to explain.   
Overall, based on our brief outline of key three pillars of a rational choice program, we suggest the 
following research implication.   
Research Implication 4:  A rational choice research program focusing on rationality, choice, 
and causal mechanisms provides the foundations for superior theoretical explanation in 
management theory. 
Overall, a rational choice program is quite attractive as “rational action is its own explanation” (Hollis,  
1977), while collective and behavioural explanations remain unsatisfactory as they point to black 
boxes,which themselves require immediate further explanation.  That is, behavioural and collective 
approaches leave one quite unsatisfied as to the underlying causes of actions (Boudon, 1998a,b).  The 
broad strokes and methodological and theoretical outlines we have highlighted above we believe will 
provide management scholars the early basics for building similar models for management theory. 
 
Practical Advice for Scholars –  
Four Important Questions in Linking Micro and Macro  Before concluding we delineate 
practical advice and prescriptions for scholars by way of highlighting four important questions that we 
hope will help scholars think about how they link micro and macro in their own research.  While the 




will provide a practical and succinct tool for scholars to use in their own work.  These questions are meant 
as a practical litmus test for scholars to think about their underlying assumptions, and more generally, in 
hopes of helping scholars in their theory-building, and also to push scholars to build toward a rational 
choice program for management.   
What Are Your Assumptions About Human Nature?  An important question that rarely gets attention 
is the underlying assumptions made by scholars regarding human nature.  As noted by Simon, “nothing is 
more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research methods than our view of the 
nature of the human beings whose behavior we are studying” (1985: 303).  Answering this question gets 
at the core of thinking about links between micro and macro, as theory which begins at the macro level 
simply assumes that individuals in effect are passive receptacles of the broader cultural environment, 
without underlying consideration for matters of choice and rationality on the part of individuals.   
Furthermore, questions of the disposition of individuals, for example, salient characteristics such as 
personality, also should receive consideration.  For organization theorists, and strategists for that matter, 
this requires a familiarity (even expertise) with individual-level theories.  Given the implied division of 
labor among management scholars, rarely are scholars proficient at both individual and collective-level 
theories, while the question of human nature cuts at the very relationship between micro and macro, and 
should therefore be carefully thought about in any research project. 
How Does Something Become a Collective Property?  A bulk of collective-level theorizing happens at 
the level of metaphor or analogy.  For example, Nelson and Winter’s notion of organizational routine is 
developed via metaphor from individual skill.  However, the question of truly collective-level properties 
rarely (if ever) gets answered beyond discussing analogies between individual-level characteristics (e.g., 
identity, memory, learning) and the collective level, and over time a rather subtle process creeps in where 
collective constructs originally established via metaphor become taken for granted organizational-level 
facts (e.g., routines).   While making links with metaphor, or citing emergence, undoubtedly serves a 
temporary purpose, we believe that truly digging into the constructs, beyond analogy, is required.  This 
should take the form of explaining at what point, and why, we can truly talk about a collective capabilities 
sans individuals.  The question of something becoming a collective-level property, even in the best levels-
literature still remains a mystery (Dansereau et al., 1999: 349), as ‘emergence’ or ‘synergy’ are still 
frequently cited without more careful delineation of how and why something might emerge from lower 
levels.     Furthermore, it is rarely recognized that it is equally likely that something less, rather than 




What are the Origins of Collective-Level Variables?  A closely, related, though still separate question 
is the origin of collective-level variables.  To use the example of capabilities, presently there is a strong 
focus on collective-level origins, specifically such variables as the past, interaction, and experience 
serving as key independent variables (cf. Levitt and March, 1988).  But, as we have argued throughout 
this paper, all collective level constructs must have individual-level origins.  Digging into the past here 
may provide one way to understand origins, for example, Arrow (1974) highlights how the 
‘organizational code’ may be a function of the founders of the organization.  The matter of origins then 
requires more careful consideration of what individuals a priori, that before joining, the organization 
bring to the table.  Matters such as individual self-selection would seem important as providing 
individual-level origins for (perhaps invisible hand) collective outcomes.   
How Does Change Occur?  The question of change in organizations provides a final question which we 
believe will help scholars to link micro and macro.  While ‘change’ clearly may not be the explicit focus 
of a research project, nevertheless most papers implicitly weigh in on how individuals and organizations 
may or may not be able to change in a given environment.  While there is a rather heavy emphasis on the 
external or the environment in inducing change (cf. Greve, 2003), it would seem that the key 
differentiating factors lie at lower levels.  Put differently, while an external shock or discontinuity 
certainly may lead to organizations changing, how and what their responses are cannot meaningfully be 
ascribed to the change-inducing stimulus itself, but rather, the origins of change must lie in the choice and 
efforts that individuals and organizations make.  Thus, asking the question of how change occurs 
crystallizes underlying assumptions and we believe will help scholars to more rigorously think about their 
research.   
The purpose of the above questions is to provide broad guidelines for scholars to think about the 
underlying assumptions that their theories make, specifically with an eye toward making links between 
micro and macro levels.  The above questions certainly do not exhaust the full spectrum of the types of 
considerations that are made in any research project, but at least begin the process of pushing scholars 





With the broad outlines we have provided we hope to counteract what we suggest is partly a disappearing 
mandate for strategy and organizational analysis.  What we mean by this is that the possibility of strategic 
action (and thus management) is either suppressed by a heavy emphasis on environmental determinism – 
in other words, that various external factors come to play the role as the key independent variables 
determining individual and organizational behaviour – or obscured by an emphasis on firm-level 
constructs, notably capabilities, that effectively obscure individual action.  We argue that a rational choice 
program may mitigate against this trend.  Specifically, it would seem critical to management scholars to 
understand and be able to impute actions to individuals, rather than collective variables.  We have more 
generally outlined (using Coleman’s model) the present emphasis on macro-level concepts in 
organizational analysis, but suggest the individual-level micro-foundations are needed in order to explain 
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Table 1. Key Dimensions and Considerations for Individual-Organization Links 
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macro – micro  macro-macro  micro - micro  micro - macro 
Theoretical 
mechanisms 
Socialization  Environmental selection  Behavior  Rational design, invisible 
hand mechanisms, 
exchange  
Key question(s)  What are key contextual 
and environmental factors 
determining behavior? 
What is the role of culture 
in determining outcomes?  
 
How does the 
organization respond to 
environmental pressures?  
What are the routines and 
programs of the 
organization? 
What are the underlying 
origins of interaction – 
why, with whom etc. 
is there an underlying, 
behavioral interaction-
factor (“socialization” and 
resulting “emergence), or 




How do aggregate 
structures, institutions, 
etc. emerge from 
individual action and 
interaction?  
What is the process  
 of sorting or self- 
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